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ABSTRACT
The Transmission of Mentalization:
How Parental Reflective Function on the Parent Development Interview Relates to Child
Mentalization on the Thematic Apperception Test
By Kira Boesch
Chair: Steven Tuber, Ph.D.
Mentalization is defined as the metacognitive ability to think about one’s own and
other’s thoughts and feelings, with the goal of comprehending behavior (Benbassat &
Priel, 2012). Mentalization is associated with secure attachment, and is both directly and
indirectly linked to multiple social and emotional outcomes. This study looked at the
correlation between parent and child mentalization as a means of exploring the impact of
parent reflectiveness on children’s’ mentalization capacities.
Methods: This study utilized archival data collected at The Psychological Center, a
community mental health clinic at the City College of New York. The sample consisted
of 15 parent-child dyads. Data was collected as part of the intake process for children
beginning treatment at The Psychological Center. The children in this clinical population
ranged in age from 4.5 to 15.
Parent reflective function (RF) was measured using Fonagy’s RF scale (Fonagy,
Target, Steele & Steele, 1998) as applied to the Parent Development Interview (Aber,
Slade, Berger, Bresgi & Kaplan, 1985). Child mentalization was measured in an original
way, using a composite measure of seven scales of the Social Cognition and Object
Relations Scale (SCORS; Westen, 2002) as applied to the Thematic Apperception Test
(Morgan & Murray, 1935).
Results: This study did not yield any statistically significant results. However, the effect
sizes of the correlations indicated a trend by which parent and child mentalization
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capacities did appear to be positively associated with one another, with parent reflective
function also appearing to be related to various aspects of child object relations.
Discussion: Methodological limitations are discussed so as to shed light on directions for
future research on this important topic.
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INTRODUCTION
For the first many months of a child’s life, he* is literally dependent upon those
around him to interpret his needs, wants, desires, and wishes. His inability to express his
inner states is not for his want of having them, as anyone who has spent time with a
young child can attest. He can think and feel and desire, and yet his ability to express
those things remains primitive for several years. Not only can he not yet meet his own
needs or satisfy his own wants, he also cannot express them unequivocally. It could be
argued that the job of the caretaker of a young child is almost entirely comprised of
construing the child’s meanings. Even caring for an infant’s most basic, most physical
needs requires this process of interpretation of his inner states. Is that sharp cry indicating
the feeling of hunger, of discomfort due to a wet diaper, or the desire for a cuddle?
One can only imagine that in each and every parent-child dyad, this process of
interpretation looks a little bit different- that no two caregivers would construe a child’s
expressions identically. Luckily, as Winnicott captured in his concept of the “good
enough mother” most parents’ versions of responsiveness to their children’s expressions
result in a child’s physical and emotional needs being met sufficiently well (Winnicott,
1960). But what are the individual differences that result from the distinct ways in which
caregivers’ interpret a young child’s expressions?
It has now been well-documented that parents’ interactions with their children
strongly influence children’s social and emotional competencies, including their
understanding of their own and others’ minds (e.g. Kårstad, Wichstrøm, Reinfjell, Belsky
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For ease of reading, the male pronoun is used here to represent children of both genders.
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& Berg‐Nielsen, 2015; Doan & Wang, 2010; Ereky-Stevens, 2008; Taumoepeau &
Ruffman, 2008; Racine, Carpendale & Turnbull, 2006; Symons, Fossum & Collins, 2006;
Shipman & Zeman, 2001; Ruffman, Perner & Parkin, 1999; Eisenberg, Cumberland &
Spinrad, 1998; Gottman, Katz & Hooven, 1996; Denham, Zoller & Couchoud, 1994;
Dunn, Brown & Beardsall, 1991a; Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla & Youngblade,
1991b; Dix & Lochman, 1990.) As Main (1991) stated, children’s early relationships
with their caregivers not only help to shape the content of the child’s mind- what they
know- but also ability of the child to use this knowledge. This observation highlights the
importance of the emotional tenor of the child’s earliest and most important relationships
with his caregivers. It is not just how a caregiver treats ‘emotion’ as a construct, but how
the caregiver treats the child, and responds to the child’s emotions, that influence the
child’s budding relationship to himself, to others, and to the world of feelings. It is
therefore critical to study the way in which parents think about their children and their
feelings in the context of the parent-child relationship. The current study proposes to do
just that. The extent to which parents reflect on their children’s internal states will be
investigated in terms of its effect on their children’s capacity to consider the thoughts and
feelings of others. Parent interviews about their children, coded for reflectiveness about
their child’s minds, will be correlated with the extent to which children reflect on the
minds of others as measured by a storytelling test.
The literature review below will first briefly introduce the construct of
attachment, as the backdrop against which the measure of parental reflectiveness used in
the current study (reflective function) was developed. It will then introduce the principal
constructs that have been used to study the impact of parent reflectiveness on parent-child
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relationships. The reciprocal relationship between reflective function and attachment will
then be reviewed. The importance of reflective function as an outcome variable will be
illustrated through the literature linking reflective function to the creation of a robust
sense of self, as well as research that establishes the connection between poor reflective
function and risk for psychopathology. Finally, the current research will be presented in
the context of recent studies that provide preliminary evidence for the primary hypothesis
that parent reflection of the child’s internal states facilitates the development of this same
capacity in the child.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Attachment
The attachment system was initially conceptualized by John Bowlby, who viewed
it primarily as a means through which human infants receive the protection that they
require (Bowlby, 1969.) Bowlby viewed the infant’s attachment behavior with his
caregiver as evolutionarily-driven, yet nevertheless experienced by the infant as a more
or less satisfying emotional relationship. Bowlby and the attachment theorists who
succeeded him suggested that children internalize elements of their earliest relationships,
forming “internal working models” or mental representations of what close relationships
are like (Bowlby, 1969; Bretherton, 1992).
Mary Ainsworth’s pioneering research established a system for identifying
individual differences in infant’s attachment patterns in the context of the relationship
with their primary caregivers (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978). Ainsworth
developed the research paradigm commonly referred to as “strange situation” in which an
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infant’s behavior is observed over a series of separations and reunions with her caregiver
(Ainsworth, 1970). Ainsworth’s empirically-derived classification system remains in use
today. In this system, secure attachment is contrasted with three types of insecure
attachment- insecure avoidant, insecure resistant and disorganized attachment. Secure,
insecure avoidant and insecure resistant attachments describe organized patterns of
response to separations from the primary caregiver. In contrast, the category of
disorganized attachment represents a lack of a systematic response to separation distress
on the part of the infant (Main & Hesse, 1990.) In the case of a secure attachment, the
infant can trust that his needs will be met by his caregiver. The parent has been reliably
present for the infant in a predictable fashion. This allows for the infant’s use of the
parent as a secure base from which to explore the surrounding environment with maximal
freedom and flexibility (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970). In contrast, babies classified as
insecure avoidant are thought to be overregulating their needs for closeness, comfort and
security (Slade, 2000). Behaviorally, they favor an interest in the world of objects over
expression of their needs for connection with others. Infants classified as insecure
resistant demonstrate ambivalent feelings toward their mothers upon reunion in the
strange situation, a manifestation of dysregulated emotions in which a need for closeness
is manifest alongside anger at the mother for leaving (Slade, 2000).
Based on Bowlby’s original notion of internal working models, Main, Kaplan and
Cassidy (1985) argued for individual differences in attachment organization to be viewed
instead as individual differences in the mental representation of attachment. This
reconceptualization opened the door to empirically studying attachment classifications in
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adults by analyzing their narratives about relationships. Main et al., (1985) introduced the
Adult Attachment Interview in order to do just that.
The Adult Attachment Interview.
The AAI is a semi-structured interview that asks adults 15 standardized questions
pertaining to their relationships with their parents. The interview asks that adults report
on aspects of their relationships to their parents when they were children, yet it demands
that parents reflect on their memories from their present perspective (van IJzendoorn,
1995). Adults are prompted to provide specific memories to support their more general
statements (Main et al., 1985).
The AAI does not measure the security of the adult’s attachment relationship to
their parents per se. Rather, it was designed to assess the adult’s present state of mind
with respect to attachment, or in other words, her mental representation of how
information about close relationships is internally organized, approached, or avoided (van
IJzendoorn, 1995). The AAI was developed for use with parents under the assumption
that individual differences in parents’ mental representations of attachment would affect
their response to their child’s attachment signals and thus have a large affect on the
nature of the child’s attachment relationships (Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy &
Locker, 2004). As a result, the three major classifications of adult mental attachment
representations are based upon the organized categories of infant attachment.
The classification of secure is given to adults who provide clear narratives that are
well-supported by their examples and memories, and thus are deemed to be coherent in
their evaluation of their past experiences, regardless of the nature of those experiences or
early relationships themselves (Van IJzendoorn, 1995). The dismissing classification is
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assigned to narratives in which the participant seems to minimize their attention to
attachment-related feelings and experiences, and often reports difficulty remembering
things pertaining to their attachment relationships (Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy
& Locker, 2005; Main et al., 1985.) A participant classified as dismissive may provide
descriptions of parents that either lack support or are even directly contradicted within the
narrative, without the conscious realization of this by the interviewee (Slade et al.,
2005b). Finally, the preoccupied classification is reserved for participants who seem to be
attending too much to attachment-related phenomena, demonstrating preoccupation with
attachment figures and sometimes displaying heightened affect with regard to their
caregivers. Their narratives tend to be long and to digress from the issue at hand, at times
even appearing nonsensical. Adults whose narratives are categorized as dismissing and
preoccupied are considered to have insecure mental representations of attachment
relationships (Main et al., 1985). Following Main et al.’s (1985) initial qualitative study,
a fourth classification was established, which is usually referred to as unresolved. This
classification is assigned to parents who cannot be classified in any of the other three
categories (Main & Hesse, 1990).
These adult attachment classifications have been shown to be stable over time.
Ward Carlson and Altman (1992, as cited in Benoit & Parker, 1994) demonstrated that
the AAI classifications remained stable for adolescent mothers between pregnancy and a
second AAI administration 18 months later. Bakermans-Kranenburg and Van IJzendoorn
(1993) found that 78% of AAI classifications from AAI’s administered two months apart
were concordant in a sample of mothers in the Netherlands. Benoit and Parker (1994)
replicated this result with a sample of Caucasian mothers from middle to upper middle
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class homes. They found that when mothers were administered the AAI during the last
month of pregnancy and again when their babies were 12 months old, the concordance
between the two classifications assigned was 77%. Furthermore, when looking only at the
three resolved categories of attachment classifications, the authors observed a 90%
concordance rate within individuals. In this last sample, Benoit and Parker (1994) found
that a secure attachment classification was more likely to endure than an insecure
classification.
One of the main demonstrations of the empirical strength of the AAI has been its
consistent ability to predict the attachment classification of infants based on the AAI
classification of their parents. The following section will review this robust literature.
The Intergenerational Transmission of Attachment
Numerous studies performed across diverse countries and populations have
demonstrated that secure attachment is transmitted across generations. Main et al., (1985)
first demonstrated this in a longitudinal study. In a sample of mothers drawn from the
Berkeley Social Development Project, they found that parent-infant attachment status
when the child was 12-18 months old was significantly correlated with their parents’
attachment classification on the AAI 5 years later. This finding was stronger for mothers,
with a correlation of r = .62, but significant for both parents nevertheless (father AAI
classification was correlated with infant-father attachment security with a Pearson
correlation of r= .37).
Van IJzendoorn, Kranenburg, Zwart-Woudstra, and Van Busschbach, (1991)
replicated this finding on a sample of parents in the Netherlands. Like Main et al., (1985),
they administered the AAI to parents following the assessment of attachment security of
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parents to their infants, in this case two years later. They found a very strong association
between the AAI classification of mothers and the attachment security of their infants.
77% of the infants could be classified as either secure or insecure as a function of their
mother’s AAI classification as autonomous or nonautonomous. In contrast, only 62% of
infants could be classified on the basis of paternal AAI classification, a number that only
approached statistical significance (van IJzendoorn et al., 1991).
Benoit and Parker (1994) again replicated this finding but with the important
difference of the mother’s AAI classification being assessed during her pregnancy, prior
to the assessment of her infant’s attachment status more than one year later. The authors
found that the concordance rate was 68% when all four AAI classifications were utilized
and 81% using only the original three resolved categories of attachment organization.
The researchers furthermore found a significant concordance between grandmothers’ and
mothers’ AAI classifications in 81 dyads using the 3-category classification system.
Ward and Carlson (1995) extended these findings to a sample of economically
disadvantaged adolescent women primarily of minority status. In this study the AAI was
administered during the 3rd trimester of pregnancy, and infants were observed in the
strange situation at 15 months of age. There was a correspondence rate of 78% between
autonomous/nonautonomous classification on the AAI for the adolescent mothers and
secure/insecure infant attachment. Furthermore, 73% of moms classified as dismissing
had avoidant infants, 86% of moms classified as autonomous had secure infants, 60% of
moms classified as preoccupied had resistant infants, and 43% of moms classified as
unresolved had disorganized infants.
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Finally, in his extensive review, van IJzendoorn (1995) further established that the
effect size for the relationship between parental and child attachment was impressively
large, with an effect size of 1.06 for the secure/insecure split in a sample of 854 dyads
across 18 studies, including some of those detailed above. These strong findings present
the question of what the mechanism for the transmission of attachment may be. In his
review, Van IJzendoorn (1995) not only looked at the transmission of attachment across
generations, but also performed a meta-analysis of studies linking the AAI to parental
sensitivity/responsiveness given that sensitivity has often been theorized to be an
important mechanism through which attachment may be transmitted. However, van
IJzendoorn found unconvincing evidence for parent responsiveness as a mediator of
attachment transmission. In subsequent studies, parental reflective function has emerged
as a strong contender. These studies will be detailed below in the section on
mentalization and attachment, following an introduction of mentalization and related
concepts.

Conceptualizations of Parent Reflectiveness
There are several constructs that have been developed as lenses through which to
examine parental responsiveness to their children’s internal states. Three such constructs
are Mind-Mindedness (MM), developed by Meins (1997), Parental-Meta-Emotion
Philosophy (PMEP), developed by Gottman and colleagues (1996), and Mentalization,
developed by Fonagy and colleagues (1991). These three constructs can be seen as
measuring discrete but overlapping concepts. Given their overlap, each of these
constructs is sometimes referred to as “mentalization” within studies, even though that
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name originally was within the theoretical terminology developed by Fonagy and
colleagues.
Mind-mindedness
Mind-mindedness refers to “the proclivity to treat one’s infant as an individual
with a mind, capable of intentional behavior” (Meins et al., 2002, p. 1716). It is
operationalized during the infant’s first year of life as the parent’s propensity to comment
accurately and to not comment inappropriately on the infant’s internal states assumed to
underlie behavior. Mind-mindedness has been measured in two principal ways. In some
studies, parents were simply asked, “Can you describe [child] to me?” (e.g. Meins &
Fernyhough, 1999; Meins, Fernyhough, Russell & Clark-Carter, 1998). Attributes of the
child given in response to this question were then coded as “mental,” “behavioral,”
“physical” and “general.” Higher levels of “mental” responses were interpreted as higher
levels of mind-mindedness. Mind-mindedness has concurrently been measured through
the coding of parent vocalizations to their infant during observed parent-child interactions
(Meins & Fernyhough, 1999; Meins, Fernyhough, Fradley & Tuckey, 2001; Meins et al.,
2002).
One of the main areas of mind-mindedness research has been its effect on parents’
interpretations of children’s developing language. For example, Meins and Fernyhough
(1999) found that mothers who were more likely to describe their children in terms of
mental characteristics at age 3 were also more likely to have attributed meaning to their
children’s earliest vocalizations in infancy. The authors viewed this as a demonstration of
the continuity of maternal mind-mindedness of the first three years of life.
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Mind-mindedness has also been linked to attachment. Meins et al., (2001) found
that mothers who administered more appropriate mind-related comments with infants
aged 6 months were significantly more likely to have infants classified as secure in the
strange situation at 12 months. Meins et al., (2002) replicated this result and also found
that attachment security was negatively correlated with mother’s inappropriate mindrelated comments. This pattern of differential effects of appropriate and inappropriate
mind-related comments have led Meins and other researchers to separately consider the
independent effects of attuned and unattuned mentalistic comments as theoretically
distinct constructs.
Several studies have also linked mind-mindedness to theory of mind development
in children. Meins et al., (1998) found that mothers’ tendency to describe their three year
olds in mentalistic terms was positively correlated with their children’s performance on
two theory of mind tasks one year later. Meins et al., (2002) and Meins et al., (2003) also
found positive associations between mothers’ appropriate mind-minded comments when
children were six months old and theory of mind performance between 4-5 years of age.
Given the direct implications of these studies for the present research, they are presented
in greater detail in a subsequent section of this literature review.
Parent Meta-Emotion Philosophy
Parent meta-emotion philosophy (PMEP) is conceptually distinct from mindmindedness in that it encompasses a parent’s thoughts and feelings about emotions- not
just their own but their children’s as well (Gottman, Katz & Hooven, 1996). PMEP
involves elements of parental beliefs and behaviors. The researchers noted in pilot studies
that certain parents displayed a comfort with and willingness to engage with emotion
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(especially negative emotion) that amounted to their acting as emotion coaches with their
children. The concept of PMEP was derived from these observations to include a parent’s
awareness of his own and his child’s emotion, and a stance that his child’s expression of
negative emotion is an opportunity for closeness or coaching. It also includes validation
of his child’s emotion, the behavior of helping the child to label his feelings, and
problem-solving aimed at understanding the situation surrounding the negative emotion.
In the foundational study of PMEP, Gottman et al., (1996) conducted a “metaemotion interview” with parents in which parents were asked about their experiences of
sadness and anger, their philosophy of emotional expression and control, and their
feelings and behavior with regard to their children’s anger and sadness. Parents and
children (aged 4-5) were then observed engaged in two tasks, one in which the parent
taught the child a game, and a second in which the parent tried to elicit a story from the
child that the child had just been told. The children were later shown emotionally explicit
film clips while measures of their physiological arousal were measured. Three years later,
teachers, parents and children completed multiple scales assessing a range of child
outcomes including indicators of internalizing and externalizing behaviors, affect
expression, peer aggression, affect achievement, emotion regulation and physical health
(Gottman et al., 1996). The authors found support for PMEP in that meta-emotion (as
measured by the parent interview) was related to parenting behavior (less derogation and
more scaffolding-praising) and the child’s regulatory physiology during the first phase of
the study. Meta- emotion as assessed in this first phase of the study was also significantly
able to predict greater inhibitory control, lower levels of behavior problems, higher levels

	
  

12	
  

of academic achievement and better physical health in children in the second phase of the
study (Gottman et al., 1996; Katz Maliken & Stettler, 2012).
PMEP has since been linked to a variety of psychosocial child outcomes. It has
been studied in terms of how it affects children’s peer relationships and social
competence, and has been shown to be related to superior social skills in both
preschoolers and latency-aged children (Katz et al., 2012). Various studies have
established its connection with risk for psychopathology. For example, in a sample of
families with children in middle childhood from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds,
Lunkenheimer, Shields and Cortina (2007) looked at how emotion coaching and emotion
dismissing by parents related to child externalizing problems. In this study, emotion
coaching and dismissing were coded from a family interaction in the laboratory as
opposed to being coded from a parent interview as in Gottman et al., (1996). The authors
found that emotion dismissing was significantly negatively correlated with children’s
externalizing behaviors, but emotion coaching did not directly predict fewer externalizing
behaviors, contrary to the hypothesis. These authors also found that in families where
parents engaged in both emotion coaching and dismissing, emotion coaching was related
to lower internalizing problems for children, and less emotional lability. This effect was
specifically driven by the coaching of negative emotions (Lunkenheimer et al., 2007).
Other studies have also found evidence for the relationship between PMEP and
both externalizing and internalizing behaviors. Shortt, Stoolmiller, Smith-Shine, Eddy &
Sheeber (2010) studied a large community sample comprised of sibling pairs with one
child in late elementary school and one child in middle school. They administered the
Parent Meta-Emotion Interview (Katz & Gottman, 1986) to mothers and found that
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mothers’ emotion coaching of anger was linked to better anger regulation in the
adolescent sibling, and fewer externalizing behaviors three years later in the younger
sibling (Shortt et al., 2010). Finally, Katz and Hunter (2007) found that mothers who
were more accepting and expressive of their own emotions (as assessed in the Parent
Meta-Emotion Interview) were more likely to have adolescents with lower levels of
depressive symptoms, higher self-esteem and fewer externalizing problems.
Mentalization
Finally, there is the concept of mentalization, which encompasses important
elements of mind-mindedness and PMEP. Mentalization is the preconscious process by
which people view and interpret behavior as being caused by mental states. It entails
imagining what others might be thinking or feeling while keeping in mind that even with
regard to oneself, one cannot definitively know the contents of someone’s mind (Fonagy,
2006). Like PMEP, it is believed to require metacognitive processes, that is, an ability to
monitor, assess, and generally observe one’s own thought processes. Mentalization has
been defined as the metacognitive ability to think about one’s own and others’ thoughts
and feelings, with the goal of comprehending behavior (Benbassat & Priel, 2012).
Mentalization encompasses both self-reflective and interpersonal aspects
(Benbassat & Priel, 2012; Slade, 2005). With regard to the self, mentalization involves
the processes of being open to emotional experience and to the process of making
meaning of emotional experiences non-defensively (Slade, 2005). Simultaneously,
mentalizing includes an effort to understand the thoughts, feelings, intentions, beliefs and
desires of others and is considered to be a necessary and foundational prerequisite to
productive significant relationships (Benbassat & Priel, 2012; Slade, 2005). As a means
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of better understanding the distinct mental processes at play in various situations, some
researchers have recently begun to separate mentalization processes dedicated to the
understanding of the self and those directed toward the other (e.g. Ensink et al., 2015).
Mentalization is thought to be an emotional process as well as a cognitive one. In
addition to requiring the cognitive practices of insight and perspective-taking, it entails
the emotional processes of fully experiencing and regulating emotions (Slade, 2005;
Benbassat & Priel, 2012). This simultaneous emotional and thoughtful commitment to
self and other understanding is what makes mentalization such an inherent part of
attachment relationships.
Mentalization has been more broadly researched than either mind-mindedness or
PMEP. The greater ubiquity of mentalization in the empirical research can be partly
understood by its theoretical breadth. Like PMEP but unlike mind-mindedness, it is
viewed as a capacity that includes a way of relating to the self as well as to the other, and
includes an emotional component as well as a cognitive one. As a result, it is a process
that has been found attractive to researchers in diverse niches of the field, ranging from
neuroscientists to psychoanalysts (Bateman & Fonagy, 2013).
Furthermore, unlike both mind-mindedness and PMEP, it does not refer only to
the parent-child relationship, but to a more broad-ranging capacity to view others as
intentional beings. As a result, it has emerged as a potential core process in a variety of
therapies and its role in the treatment of various psychopathologies has been a fruitful
topic of investigation for the last two decades. This makes it a particularly useful
construct in that where deficits in mentalization are discovered, there can be the direct
and immediate hope of addressing this deficit through therapies that have been
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empirically demonstrated to increase mentalization capacities (e.g. Minding the baby,
Slade et al., 2005a; Mentalization Based Therapy, Bateman & Fonagy, 2013).
Another potential reason for the relative popularity of mentalization is its
empirical relationship to other established measures and constructs. The
operationalization of mentalization in attachment contexts, termed Reflective Function
(RF) has been shown to be correlated with the Adult Attachment Interview in studies
where mind-mindedness was not (Fonagy, Steele & Steele, 1991; Rosenblum,
McDonough, Sameroff & Muzik. 2008). As a result, mentalization has emerged as a
major factor in explaining the transmission of attachment from one generation to the next
(Benbassat and Priel, 2012; Rosenblum et al., 2008; Slade et al., 2005b) a crucially
important budding area of research.
Some of the primary arenas of mentalization research- attachment, self
development, and the risk for psychopathology- will be presented below, following a full
introduction of Reflective Function as the measure of mentalization.

Reflective Function
Reflective function refers to the extent that people can mentalize with regard to
their internalized representations of their attachment relationships. It is measured in two
ways. Adult reflective function is measured with a coding system that is applied to the
AAI, and parental reflective function is now measured utilizing the Parent Development
Interview.
Adults have been found to differ extremely in the extent to which they mentalize
about their attachment relationships. When asked to examine 200 AAI transcripts of
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mothers and fathers, raters found distinct levels of evidence for reflectiveness across
individuals. Several subjects displayed only the lowest level of reflectiveness, such as
platitudes and general statements such as “one must try to appreciate others’ point of
view” (Fonagy et al., 1991b, p. 210). Other individuals’ AAI transcripts evidenced
moderate evidence of reflectiveness, such as genuine psychological statements that were
nevertheless generalized and not unique to the individuals in question. Finally, some
demonstrate evidence of reflectiveness including understanding of both conscious and
unconscious thoughts and feelings influencing the behavior of both self and others
(Fonagy et al., 1991b). These observations are what led to the development of the
Reflective Function scale by Fonagy and colleagues. The existence of a range of
reflective capacities among individuals is supported by the consistent observation of a
normal distribution of scores on the RF scales and high interrater reliabilities in studies
utilizing the RF scale (e.g. Benabassat & Priel, 2012; Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Slade et
al., 2005b). Fonagy et al., (1991b) in the pioneering study, found an interrater reliability
of .7 for mothers’ transcripts and .75 for fathers’ transcripts.
The Reflective Function scale that is applied to the AAI focuses on the
individual’s ability to think about his/her own feelings, as well as those of his/her parents.
It specifically considers an adult’s awareness of how mental states work and his/her
application of mental state explanations of behavior, among other factors (Slade, 2005).
As the study of Reflective Function in parents per se has become increasingly
popular, researchers have turned to what is believed to be a more direct measure of
parental reflective functioning, the Parent Development Interview (Aber et al., 1985).
This interview, like the AAI, is a semi-structured interview that measures a parent’s
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internal working models of relationships. Consisting of 45 questions, the PDI specifically
addresses parent’s representations of their relationships with their children, of their
children as individuals, and of themselves as parents (Slade, 2005). The application of the
RF scale to the PDI is believed to shed light on individual differences in mentalizing
within the parent-child relationship that are general and stable. Quite distinct from the
measures of mind-mindedness and parental meta-emotion philosophy that measure parent
behavior in a given interaction, reflective function measures mentalization taking place
not in that moment but rather, ‘off-line’ (Sharp & Fonagy, 2008). The RF Scale applied
to the PDI is intended to measure a parent’s principal stance toward their child as an
intentional or psychological being. It is assumed that this general attitude thus informs the
parent’s behavior toward the child across multiple interactions over time (Sharp &
Fonagy, 2008).
A normal distribution of parent reflectiveness was observed by Slade et al.,
(2005b) in using the modified RF scale applied to the PDI. In applying the RF Scale to
parent narratives about their children, Slade et al. (2005b) observed the following
manifestations of different levels of reflectiveness. Parents who were classified as low in
RF spoke about their child in such a way that suggested that the parent was unaware of
the fact that their child even had thoughts and feelings. Other examples of low RF
included discussion of a child’s behavior in terms of stable personality traits rather than
internal states. Parents considered to have low RF also demonstrated low levels of
awareness about and reflection upon their own internal states (Slade, 2005). Parents who
evidenced moderate levels of RF recognized the existence of their children’s internal
states but did not connect those states to their own behavior and interaction with the child
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(Slade, 2005). Finally, on the high RF end of the spectrum, parents showed keen
awareness of their children as intentional beings. These parents drew connections
between their own internal states, their behavior, and the mental states and behavior of
their children.
The drastically different stances adopted by parents with different levels of
parental RF have a large impact on their children’s socio-emotional development. The
following sections will explore the ways in which parental RF has been linked to both
parent and child attachment status, as well as child risk for psychopathology and self
development.

Attachment and Mentalization
Attachment and mentalization support one another in a reciprocal relationship.
This relationship is further buffered by neural associations, and by the assumption that
attachment relationships have the evolutionary function of facilitating social cognitive
skills (Fonagy, 2006). The nature of this reciprocal relationship is a complex one, but one
that is bolstered by a significant amount of empirical evidence as well as common-sense
theory. The key elements of the interrelationship between attachment and mentalization
are presented in this section.
Parental Reflective Function and Adult Attachment Classification
Parents who are rated high in Reflective Function have been shown to be more
likely to receive a secure/autonomous classification on the AAI. Fonagy et al. (1991b) in
their pioneering study of Reflective Function, found that RF was related to the
dimensions that are used to rate the AAI. The strongest correlation was between RF and
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coherence, which has been found to be the best single indicator of AAI classification, as
well as of child attachment status (Fonagy et al., 1991c; Ainsworth & Eichberg, 1990;
Main et al., 1985). Arnott and Meins (2007) replicated Fonagy’s result, showing that in a
sample of mothers and fathers from the northeast of England, both mothers and fathers
who were classified as autonomous on the AAI had significantly higher RF scores than
mothers and fathers classified as non-autonomous. In both of these studies, AAI and RF
were both coded using the same data set of AAI transcripts.
Slade et al., (2005b) further demonstrated a connection between RF and AAI
classification, and in this case RF was established using the PDI. They found that
autonomous mothers had significantly higher RF scores than mothers classified as
dismissing, preoccupied, and/or unresolved. Furthermore, both dismissing and
preoccupied mothers had higher RF scores than mothers in the unresolved group.
ANOVA analyses of the RF differences between mothers were significant both for the
four attachment categories and the dichotomous autonomous/nonautonomous
categorization. These findings established that a mother’s attachment status assessed
during pregnancy was strongly able to predict maternal reflective functioning as
measured by the PDI when the infant was 10 months old.
Parental Mentalization and Parent-Infant Attachment
In multiple studies, parental mentalization has also been shown to predict secure
attachment between the parent and infant in the strange situation at one year (Fonagy et
al., 1991c; Slade et al., 2005b; Meins et al., 2001; Karen-Korie et al., 2002 as cited in
Fonagy & Target, 2005). This connection is consistent across multiple measures of
parental mentalization, including RF measured with both the AAI and PDI, as well as
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mind-mindedness measured in live interactions between mothers and children (Meins et
al., 2012; Meins et al., 2002; Meins, 1997). Furthermore, parental mentalization has been
shown to predict secure attachment in both mothers and fathers (Arnott & Meins, 2007).
Grienenberger, Kelly and Slade (2005) found that the relationship between
maternal RF and infant-mother attachment security was mediated by the affective
communication between mother and infant. This sheds light on one of the potential
mechanisms through which RF is linked to secure attachment. More insight into the
parent behaviors that could be responsible for the connection between parent
mentalization and infant attachment is provided by the finding that mothers’
appropriate/accurate mind-related comments were positively correlated with infant
attachment security while mothers’ inappropriate/inaccurate comments were negatively
correlated with infant attachment security. In other words, parents who rate higher in
mentalization may promote secure attachment relationships with their infants by more
accurately commenting on their infants’ minds (Arnott & Meins, 2007). Later studies
have replicated this finding. For example, Meins et al., (2012) found that both maternal
appropriate mind-related comments and non-attuned mind-related comments in a freeplay session with their 8-month old infants each independently predicted mother- infant
attachment security when the infants were 15 months old.
Other studies linking parent mentalization with parent-infant attachment have
focused on parental sensitivity as a potential mechanism for the effects. Cheung (2015, as
cited in Zeegers, Colonnesi, Stams & Meins, 2017) demonstrated that mentalization
predicted attachment security independently of parent sensitivity, although more strongly
so when parent sensitivity was not controlled for.
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These findings do not only tell a story about attachment security and how to
predict it. They also shed light on less favorable attachment classifications, including
disorganized attachment. For example, Slade et al. (2005b) found that a group of infants
classified as disorganized had mothers whose RF scores were a standard deviation below
those whose infants were classified as secure. Similarly, Schechter et al. (2005) found
that in a traumatized population, relatively poor maternal reflective function predicted
negativity and distortions in attributions about the infant. This finding was independent of
the extent of interpersonal violence suffered by the mothers in the study, and also of the
extent of maternal PTSD. Finally, parents with disorganized attachments to their children
have been shown to depict their children as not having thoughts and feelings that can be
taken into account (Slade, 2005).
Although there is a strong case for mentalization and attachment going hand in
hand, there is also some evidence that the relationship may be more complex. Arnott and
Meins (2007) found that in the case of parents with non-autonomous AAI classifications,
infants were more likely to be securely attached to their parents if the parents
demonstrated high levels of mind-mindedness. As such, parental mind-mindedness could
be a buffer against poor child outcomes such as insecure attachment (Arnott & Meins,
2007).
Parent-Infant Attachment and Child Mentalization/ Theory of Mind
Secure attachment is theorized to be conducive to the development of
mentalization in the child. Empirical findings indeed demonstrate that secure attachment
may facilitate developmental achievements in the social-emotional domain. Securely
attached infants have been shown to develop theory of mind earlier (Meins, 1997) and to
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demonstrate more signs of having a reflective self in early childhood, including engaging
in more self-talk during toddlerhood and making more spontaneous self-reflective
comments at six years old (Main, Hesse & Kaplan, 1995).
Steele, Steele, Croft & Fonagy (1999) found that children who were securely
attached at 12 months of age demonstrated better understanding of mixed emotions five
years later, at the age of 6, than did children who had been insecurely attached at 12
months. In fact, when entered into a regression analysis with other factors including the
child’s age, only attachment status with mother significantly predicted mixed-emotion
understanding. Fonagy, Redfern and Charman (1997) also established a link between
attachment status and reflective functioning. In their study, attachment was measured
using the semi-projective Separation Anxiety Test (SAT) in children aged 3-6. They
found that the children with secure SAT attachment were more likely to pass a beliefdesire reasoning task (a measure of theory of mind) than those with ambiguous and
insecure SAT attachment status. Again, the attachment status was the only significant
predictor of theory of mind when entered into a regression analysis with other factors- in
this case verbal IQ and a teacher’s relative ranking of social maturity. Finally, de Rosnay
and Harris (2002) looked at the performances of children aged 3-6 on two emotionunderstanding tasks along with their concurrent SAT attachment status. They found that
overall attachment security as assessed on the SAT made a significant contribution to
emotion understanding.
It is important to mention that it is not universally believed that theory of mind
development can be influenced by attachment relationships. Baron-Cohen (1995) and
Avis & Harris (1991) suggest that theory of mind development is fixed and universal, and
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therefore impervious to influences from the social environment. However, one large twin
study found that environmental factors indeed explained much of the variance in
children’s performance in a theory of mind task (Hughes et al., 2005). Additionally, there
have been countless empirical studies linking factors related to the social environment to
children’s emotion understanding, including family emotion talk (e.g. Dunn et al., 1991a;
Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla & Youngblade, 1991), mother-child emotion talk
(Farrant, Maybery & Fletcher, 2013); and parental emotional availability (e.g. Denham et
al., 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1998) just to name a few. Nevertheless, some more recent
empirical studies that have considered both the effects of parent mentalization (mindmindedness) and attachment security on children’s theory of mind performance have
found that attachment was not, in fact, a strong predictor of child theory of mind
performance (Laranjo, Bernier, Meins & Carlson, 2010; Laranjo, Bernier, Miens &
Carlson, 2014). Alongside the controversy in the empirical literature, theoretical
knowledge about the processes through which mentalization develops posits that secure
attachments are conducive to emotion understanding and mentalization.
The Development of Mentalization in the Child
While the ability to develop mentalization is present in all human infants, the
social environment determines the course of its development (Fonagy, 2002). The infant
comes to think of others’ minds through the process of being understood and responded
to as a person with a mind in his own right (Fonagy & Target, 2005). Specifically, when a
caregiver holds in her mind the reasons for her infant’s behavior, she represents these in
her behavior toward the infant. Through these interactions the child learns that mental
states exist, and comes to recognize them in himself and then in others (Slade, 2005). In
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this way, the development of mentalization goes hand in hand with the consolidation of a
sense of self, as will be further explicated below. It is noteworthy, too, that in addition to
appreciating her child’s mental state, a parent must be able to contain her child’s
emotional experiences in order for mentalization to develop successfully (Benbassat &
Priel, 2012).
Parents’ ability to mentalize must be seen as existing on a continuum. As Fonagy
et al., (1991b) observed, individuals vary in their overall proclivity to interpret their
child’s behavior in terms of internal states. However, at the same time, there are
inevitably variations within the individual that are influenced by a wide range of
contextual factors, emotional, situational, and otherwise. For parsimony, the research
findings presented in this and other sections refer to parents’ mentalization capacities as
low, moderate or high. These categorizations refer to the preponderance of either
adaptive or poor mentalizing within an individual.
Parents who are well-attuned to their children’s internal states are able to more
accurately interpret their children’s intentions and express interest in doing so (Fonagy,
2006). Consistent with this notion, mothers with higher RF scores have been shown to
utilize more mind-minded comments about their child’s mind (Rosenblum et al., 2008).
Parents who are accurately tuned in to their children’s mental states also will have
thoughts that are more benign, such that the children can have a healthy interest in and
fearlessly come to know the content of their caregiver’s minds (Fonagy, 2006). These
highly reflective parents are also more likely to engage in mentalizing-promoting
activities such as pretend play (Fonagy, 2006.)
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On the other end of the spectrum, parents with less developed mentalizing
capacities may not be able to mirror their children’s affect in a way that is conducive to
containment or to the development of mentalizing capacities in the child. Slade (2005)
identified two ways that this may commonly occur. Parents may respond to the infant’s
fear with fear of their own, which can make fear unsafe to experience and hard to
symbolize in words. Parents may also inaccurately interpret an infant’s intention (for
example imagining that the child is trying to manipulate the parent) leading the parent to
enact a response that does not match the child’s actual intention. In this situation, the
child does not come to know the actual content of his own mind, undermining his
eventual ability to mentalize. Similarly, parents who have been the victims of relational
trauma may have shut down their own thinking about their own and other’s mental states,
because doing so has at times been dangerous (Fonagy, 2006). Research supporting these
ideas has shown that children with histories of sexual abuse had mentalization difficulties
(Ensink et al., 2015). Furthermore, maltreating parents have been shown to have
difficulties understanding their children’s emotions (Shipman & Zeman, 2001) and may
engage their children less often in emotional discussions (Edwards, Shipman & Brown,
2005).
In sum, mentalization in children is supported by parent behaviors that are
indicative both of parent reflective capacities and conducive to the creation of a secure
and safe attachment to the child. This is part of the reason why mentalization has recently
been put forth as a potential mechanism for the transmission of attachment from parent to
child.
RF as a mediator in the Intergenerational Transmission of Attachment
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Given that attachment has been shown in twin studies to have minimal
heritability, it appears that environmental factors are largely responsible for the
transmission of secure attachment from parent to child (Fonagy & Target, 2005).
Moreover, parents can be understood to be more responsible for the nature of the parentchild relationship than are children, leaving the question of how parents transmit their
mental representations of attachment to their children of paramount importance (van
IJzendoorn, 1995.)
Slade (2005) has provided strong evidence for the potential role of mentalization
in transmitting attachment from parent to child. She found that maternal RF was related
both to adult attachment assessed during pregnancy and infant attachment assessed at one
year of age. Preliminary analyses supported the hypothesis that parental RF is a crucial
mediator in the intergenerational transmission of attachment. Arnott and Meins (2007)
replicated this, in finding that all infants in their study who had a parent that was both
classified as secure/autonomous and shown to be high in mind-mindedness was securely
attached to their parent. On the other side, most infants whose parent was nonautonomous and low in mind-mindedness were insecurely attached. It is hypothesized
that secure attachment status for the mother allows her to feel safe and able to explore her
own mind, and that of her infant. In turn, the mother’s awareness of her infant leads the
way for interactions that help the infant to develop his own stable psychological self
(Fonagy & Target, 2005.)
Unfortunately, since 2005 there have not been any new studies looking at
mentalization as a possible mechanism for the intergenerational transmission of
attachment (Sette, Coppola & Cassibba, 2015). Those studies that have considered
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potential mechanisms for the transmission of attachment have predominantly focused on
parental sensitivity and other parenting behaviors (Verhage et al., 2016).

Mentalization and Psychopathology
Studies show that inaccurate or absent parent mentalizing is correlated with poor
child outcomes. Inaccurate mentalizing in parents can set off a chain reaction of events.
One study found that mothers whose inaccurate mentalization led them to interpret their
children’s negative behavior as willful and indicative of negative personality dispositions
were themselves more upset about this negative behavior (Dix & Lochman, 1990). In
turn, this would have affected the mother’s own intrapersonal emotional response and the
part of her emotional response directed toward her child (Sharp & Fonagy, 2008). It is
known from Gottman’s research on PMEP that parent affect and affect regulation
influence a parent’s mentalization of their child’s mind (e.g. Gottman et al., 1996). In
short, inaccurate parent mentalizing can lead to parent upset, which then could set the
stage for further limitations in mentalizing of the child’s mind.
Another example of the potential ill effects of inaccurate parent mentalizing can
be found in the literature on the hostile attribution bias- showing that mothers who have
this bias and are more likely to interpret their children’s intentions as hostile are also
more likely to have aggressive children (Strassberg, 1997).
In addition to inaccurate mentalization, it is known that an absence of
mentalization by attachment figures is also detrimental to children. In cases of abuse and
neglect in which caregivers are not available for interpreting their children’s mind,
children show poor emotion discrimination (Edwards et al., 2005; Pollak, Cicchetti,
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Hornung, & Reed, 2000) and delays in theory of mind development (Cicchetti, Rogosch,
Maughan, Toth, & Bruce, 2003; Pears & Fisher, 2005) and emotional understanding
(Camras, Sachs-Alter, & Ribordy, 1996; Rogosch, Cicchetti, & Aber, 1995; Shipman &
Zeman, 1999). In the case of abuse by a caregiver, the attempt to know that caregiver’s
mind, including their intentions, thoughts and feelings, can be fear-inducing and
dangerous, leading children to flee from any attempt at doing so (Tuber, Boesch, Gorkin
and Terry, 2014; Fonagy et al., 2002). Consistent with this, in her dissertation research,
Srinivasan (2006) found that survivors of severe child abuse had poor reflective
functioning as adults.
As this body of literature shows, there are risks associated with the absence of a
caregiver who can mentalize the child’s mind with good-enough accuracy. However, it is
not necessarily the case that the more reflective the parent, the more positive outcomes
we can expect for the child. Indeed, Benbassat and Priel (2012) found that paternal
reflective function levels, specifically, were positively correlated with the internalizing
problems of their adolescent-aged children. Although in this study the internalizing
problems reported did not reach the clinical range, it is important to consider that there
are implications for psychopathology on both ends of the mentalization spectrum.
Recent studies have established associations between lower levels of
mentalization and various psychopathological conditions. In their review, Jewell et al.
(2015) found strong evidence for an association between problems with mentalization
and eating disorder pathology. They also found that adolescents with anorexia appear to
be challenged in the skill of emotion recognition. Similarly, Kuipers, van Loenhout, van
der Ark & Bekker (2016) found that compared with healthy controls, eating disorder
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patients demonstrated a lower level of mentalization. Furthermore, within the clinical
population of patients with eating disorders, self-injurious behavior was associated with
lower mentalization.
The long-theorized link between deficits in mentalization and borderline
personality disorder (BPD) was recently empirically supported by Petersen, Brakoulias &
Langdon, 2015. They found that while people diagnosed with BPD did not differ from
healthy controls in performing simple mentalization tasks, patients with BPD showed
mentalization deficits in comparison with healthy controls when performing complex
mentalization tasks that required the integration of multiple components. Furthermore, as
the childhood experiences of punishment increased, adult mentalization ability decreased.
The importance of mentalization as a predictive factor for psychopathology is
further supported by Chiesa and Fonagy (2014)’s finding that RF mediated the
relationship between childhood adversity and psychiatric distress later in life, with higher
RF decreasing the likelihood of later psychiatric distress.

Mentalization and Self-Development
It would be remiss to present an overview of the important implications of
mentalization capacities without including the formative role that mentalization plays in
the development of a secure sense of self. Because the self develops in close conversation
with attachment figures, it is reflective function in particular that is crucial for self
development. High reflectiveness on the part of the mother is believed to foster both
autonomy and self-regulation in the child (Fonagy et al., 2002). Several practices that can
be believed to occur within relationships where mentalization is strong may lend
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themselves to successful self-development. For example, the co-construction of
narratives about emotionally significant events has been shown to facilitate
autobiographical memory, which is known to be crucial for self development (Bettens,
Favez & Stern, 2003; Laible, Murphy & Augustine, 2013; Prebble, Addis, & Tippett,
2013, as cited in Ensink et al., 2015).
As stated above, a child learns to know his own mind by being treated as someone
with a mind. In other words, his caregiver’s mirroring and reflection of his inner states
become the basis for his understanding that he has a mind and for beginning to know its
inner workings. From these early glimpses into his own mind, a core self develops
(Fonagy & Target, 2006).
The importance of mentalization for self-development is underscored by the
deficits in self-development that occur in the absence of mentalization within the
attachment relationship. For example, children who suffer abuse and neglect have been
shown to have delays in self-recognition in the mirror between 18 and 30 months of age
(Schneider-Rosen & Cicchetti, 1991). Furthermore, there is a prevalence of dissociation
in children who have suffered relational trauma in the context of their early attachment
relationships, and dissociation is a threat to an integrated sense of self and wellestablished subjectivity (Tuber et al., 2014).

Parental Mentalization and Child Theory of Mind/Mentalization Capacities
There is a significant body of research that suggests that the way parents interact
with their children vis a vis emotions can have important effects on children’s emotion
knowledge and related factors. Early studies by Carole Dunn and her colleagues
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demonstrated that family environments in which feelings were more openly discussed
and causal state language was used were conducive to Theory of Mind development in
children (Dunn et al., 1991a; Dunn et al., 1991b). Others have similarly shown that
parental discussion, rather than avoidance, of emotions, can facilitate children’s
understanding of their own and others’ minds (Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002;
Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008). In a crucial study in this area, Meins et al., (1998) found
that 3 year-old children whose mothers were more likely to describe them in terms of
their mental states rather than their behavior or physical appearance were more successful
on mentalizing tasks at the ages of 4 and 5. Additionally, children who anticipate a nonsupportive parental response to their expression of negative emotions have been shown to
evidence lower social and emotional competencies (Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Denham et
al., 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1998).
Four recent studies in particular have found preliminary evidence for the main
hypothesis of the current research- that mentalization capacities are linked in parents and
children. Benbassat and Priel (2012) found a correlation between the RF levels of parents
and their adolescent children. This association was observed both for mothers and fathers.
In this particular study, RF was assessed in parents using the PDI and RF scale, and in the
adolescent population RF was measured using the Child Attachment Index (CAI) (Target,
Fonagy & Shmueli-Goetz, 2003). Benbassat and Priel (2012) also found that several of
the other outcome variables that they considered were moderated by parental RF.
Specifically, parental warmth was associated with high levels of social self-perception in
adolescents only in the presence of high parental RF. Furthermore, paternal control was
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linked to lower levels of adolescent self-perception and high levels of externalizing, but
only in the case where paternal RF was also low.
Another study that lends direct support to the present hypothesis was performed
by Ensink et al. (2015). Like Benbassat and Priel (2012) Ensink et al. (2015) used the
PDI and RF scale that will be used in the present research. They used a newly developed
RF scale for children in conjunction with the CAI. As predicted, Ensink et al. (2015)
found a correlation between the RF levels of parents and children aged 9 and 10. From
this they concluded: “it is possible to reliably measure mentalization in children aged 712 from the narratives they produce regarding themselves and their relationships with
attachment figures” (p. 212). The present research aims to replicate this result with a
different measure of child reflective function.
In a longitudinal study, Meins et al. (2002) investigated the transmission of
mentalization from parents to children. They found that the use of appropriate mental
state commentary by mothers in interactions with their children when they were 6 months
old predicted children’s theory of mind performance at age 4. Meins et al., (2002) found
that only appropriate mental state language by parents predicted better theory of mind
scores by children, as opposed to simply the more frequent use of mental state language
in general. In other words, it is not enough for parents to simply use mental state
language; mental state language must also be attuned to the child’s actual internal world.
This suggests that studying mentalization in the context of attachment relationships is
particularly worthwhile and important. Finally, Meins et al. (2013) replicated this result
in a second longitudinal study, finding that appropriate mind-minded comments made
during a free- play session when children were 8 months old predicted children’s theory
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of mind performance at 51 months of age. The present research may be able to shed light
on the mechanism through which these powerful effects may occur.

Present Research
In the vein of the studies presented above, the present research proposes to
investigate the transmission of mentalization capacities from parent to child. Much of the
research looking at mentalization in the context of attachment has focused on very young
children. However, there is evidence for the transmission of mentalization from parents to
children in middle childhood (Ensink et al., 2015) and adolescence (Benbassat & Priel,
2012). The current research is unique in examining the mentalization capacities of
ranging in age from early childhood to adolescence.
The population of this study is also remarkable in that it represents a child clinical
population. There is a dearth of research looking at mentalization in children presenting
with psychological distress. Given the established role of mentalization as a mediating
factor between adversity and psychopathology, an investigation of mentalization in a
child clinical population is important for its potential to shed light on this phenomenon.
As discussed above, mentalization involves two distinct aspects, one that involves
self-understanding and regulation and another that has to do with taking the perspective
of others. There is some evidence for the fact that self-understanding is considered a
more complex developmental achievement, and recent evidence that self and other
understanding involve distinct, although proximal, neural networks (Bogdan, 2004 and
Lieberman, 2007 as cited in Ensink, 2015). For example, Ensink et al. (2015) found that
while maternal RF was associated with both self and other RF in children, it only
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independently contributed to explaining the variance in self RF in their sample of
sexually abused children. This powerful finding showed that maternal RF has important
predictive validity related to self -RF in children even when mentalization development is
disrupted by something like sexual abuse. Given these findings, children’s mentalization
capacities with regard to the self and those that pertain to the other will each be separately
considered, in addition to overall mentalization capacities.
In the present study, as in several of the studies cited above, parental
mentalization will be assessed using the Reflective Function (RF) scale applied to the
Parent Development Interview (PDI). Children’s mentalization capacities will be
measured on the basis of their narrative descriptions of thoughts and feelings as part of a
storytelling task. The concordance of mentalization capacities within a parent-child dyad
can thus be considered. It is hypothesized that parent reflective function and child
mentalization capacities will be shown to be positively correlated with one another,
demonstrating that in dyads where the parent exhibits a higher level of mentalization
about the child, the child also is better able to mentalize.

METHODS
Participants
Participants in this study were 15 parent-child dyads taken from a larger sample
of patients at The Psychological Center, a community mental health clinic that serves as
the training clinic for doctoral students in clinical psychology at City College. The larger
sample includes all children who underwent an intake process at The Psychological
Center during the years from 2009-2016, as well as their parents. The participants for the
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current research study were selected from the larger sample exclusively on the basis of
data availability. All dyads in which both data measures of interest were completed have
been included in the present study. The children represent a clinical population in that at
the time of data collection they were undergoing an intake at The Psychological Center, a
community mental health clinic.

Procedure
Data utilized for this study belongs to a pre-existing data set collected by Arietta
Slade and Steve Tuber at the City College of New York. All measures were administered
to children and their parents as part of the intake procedure for children entering
treatment at The Psychological Center at City College. Consent was obtained by the
intake clinician, who also completed the parent interview (The Parent Development
Interview- PDI). A second student therapist conducted the Thematic Apperception TestTAT- with the child. This measure was given following the administration of two other
measures- the Ravens Progressive Matrices Test and the Rorschach Inkblot Method.

Measures
Parent Development Interview (PDI)
The Parent Development Interview is a 45-question semi-structured clinical
interview. Questions range from asking for descriptions of the child to aspects of the
child that are particularly enjoyable or difficult for the parent. Parents are also asked to
describe themselves as parents and to compare and contrast their parenting to that of their
own parents. As such, the PDI measures a parent’s mental representation of their
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children, of themselves as parents, and of their relationships with their children. The PDI
has been shown to have strong construct, predictive and convergent validity (Slade,
Belsky, Aber & Phelps, 1999; Aber et al., 1999). It also has very strong reliability (Slade
et al., 2005b).
Reflective Function Scale
Parental reflective function will be measured utilizing The Addendum to the
Reflective Functioning Scoring Manual, which was developed for specific use with the
PDI (Slade et al., 2004b). The addendum accompanies the RF coding manual developed
by Fonagy and colleagues for use with the AAI (Fonagy et al., 1998). The RF scale is an
11-point scale ranging from -1 (negative RF) to 9 (exceptional RF). Scores below 5
indicate negative, absent or low RF while scores above 5 provide clear evidence of
mentalizing capacities (Slade et al., 2005). RF on the PDI is assessed in the following
four categories: 1. Awareness of the nature of mental states, 2. The effort to identify the
mental states that pertain to behavior, 3. Recognition of the developmental aspect of
mental states, and 4. Mental states as they arise in connection to the interviewer (Slade et
al. 2005b).
RF scores are ascertained for 21 questions on the PDI, and an overall score is
given to each interview as a whole. Answers characterized as having high RF involve
recognition of mental states both within the self and the child. These answers also
demonstrate an awareness of how mental states and behavior interact, and an appreciation
of the child’s developmental stage and limitations. Answers characterized as having low
RF may be concrete, superficial, or banal, and tend to disavow the importance or the
existence of internal states (Fonagy & Target, 2005).
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Scoring was applied to verbatim transcripts created from audio files of the
interviews. Interviews were coded by an expert coder with extensive experience applying
the RF scale to the PDI.
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)
The TAT (Morgan & Murray, 1935) is a projective storytelling test. Participants
are presented with black and white pictures depicting various scenes, many of which are
morose in nature. Participants are asked to state five things about each picture: (1) what is
happening in the picture, (2) what happened prior to the scene shown in the picture, (3)
what will happen in the future, (4) what the characters are thinking, and (5) what the
characters are feeling. The TAT is used by clinicians as a means of ascertaining
information about the individual’s internal representations of self, other, as well as their
primary affects and defensive constellations (Tuber, 2012).
The TAT is a measure that may be particularly conducive to the study of
mentalization. As Tuber (2012) pointed out, the demands that the TAT makes on the
participant are remarkably similar to those required by the AAI (and the conceptually
related PDI). Like the AAI, the TAT necessitates that the subject create a story that
coherently links the present to the past. Furthermore, the clinical index of psychological
health on the TAT is unrelated to the content of the stories per say. Just as a secure
classification on the AAI does not indicate a happier childhood or even a secure
relationship with caregivers in childhood, a healthy TAT story is not defined by whether
its resolution is happy and positive (Tuber, 2012). Finally, given that the TAT also
requires that participants discuss the internal states of the characters, it can be seen as a
task that inherently assesses “psychological mindedness” and the participant’s ability to
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engage in “emotional problem solving” (Tuber, 2012, pp. 118-119). All of these factors
combine to make the use of the TAT with the SCORS a recommended measure for the
present research.
Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale (SCORS)
The SCORS (Stein, Hilsenroth, Slavin-Mulford & Pinsker, 2011; Westen, 2002)
is a coding system that is applied to the TAT and used to index both cognitive and
affective components of an individual’s object relations. The SCORS was conceptualized
on the basis of object relations and attachment theories. It was developed to assess
dimensions of internal representations of relationships using narratives such as TAT
stories (Niec & Russ, 2002). Given that the PDI measures internal representations of
relationships, the SCORS is believed to measure a comparable construct. Furthermore, by
assessing both emotional and cognitive elements of representations, the SCORS
encompasses both dimensions addressed by the RF Scale as applied to the PDI. The
SCORS has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure for use with clinical
populations and with children, and is therefore appropriate for the present sample (Stein,
Slavin-Mulford, Sinclair, Siefert & Blais, 2012; Niec & Russ, 2002; Ordnuff & Kelsey,
1996.) Finally, the SCORS has been chosen as a measure for this study because it was
developed for use with the TAT.
The SCORS is comprised of 8 clinician-rated variables. Each variable is scored
on a 7-point rating scale, with lower scores indicating greater pathology and high scores
indicative of better overall psychological health. The 8 variables are: ‘Complexity of
Object Relations,’ ‘Affective Quality of Representations,’ ‘Emotional Investment in
Relationships,’ ‘Emotional Investment in Moral Standards,’ ‘Understanding of Social
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Causality,’ ‘Experience and Regulation of Aggressive Impulses,’ ‘Self-esteem,’ and
‘Identity and Coherence of Self.’
In past research, the SCORS has often been utilized as a measure of individual
differences, focused on differentiating clinical and nonclinical groups (Kelly, 2007). For
example, Westen, Lohr, Silk, Gold & Kerber (1990) identified patterns of SCORS
responses that could distinguish adolescents diagnosed as having Borderline personality
disorder from adolescents diagnosed with depression, and from those not carrying a
psychiatric diagnosis. Similarly, Defife, Goldberg & Westen (2015) found that
adolescents who met criteria for a personality disorder diagnosis had more pathological
scores on the SCORS scales than peers. A SCORS composite variable was able to
discriminate adolescents carrying a personality disorder diagnosis from those who did
not.
In addition to discriminating among clinical and nonclinical children/adolescents,
other studies have turned to comparing groups of children on the basis of exposure to risk
factors for psychopathology. A series of studies by Ornduff and colleagues found that
children and adolescents who had suffered physical and sexual abuse demonstrated
impairments in object relations (lower scores on the SCORS scales) compared to nonabused peers (Ornduff, 1997) and that the SCORS could meaningfully distinguish
between abused and nonabused children and adolescents (Ornduff, 1996; see also
Ornduff, 2003). Furthermore, Ornduff and colleagues were able to identify consistent
differences in SCORS performance on the basis of type of abuse. While physically
abused children achieved lower scores on all SCORS scales, sexually abused children
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demonstrated a particularly impaired performance on affective aspects of object relations
measured by the SCORS (Kelly, 1997).
A separate body of research using the SCORS with children and adolescents has
worked to establish that the SCORS can be used not only to demonstrate between
individual differences but also as a developmental measure. When developing the
SCORS, Westen (1991) believed that in theory the scales should be developmental in
nature, with the exception of the ‘Affective Quality of Relationships’ scale. Indeed,
several studies have validated this, finding for example that 4th graders outperform 3rd
graders on all scales other than the Affect scale (Niec & Russ, 2002) and that 12th graders
outperform 9th graders, and 5th graders outperform 2nd graders (Westen et al., 1991).
Taken together, these studies demonstrate that object relations develop beyond early
childhood, and thus should be studied in later childhood and even early adolescence, as is
done in the current research.
As stated above, the SCORS has been shown to be psychometrically sound. Niec
and Russ (2002) found that all of the scales of the SCORS, as predicted, were
significantly intercorrelated. The authors furthermore demonstrated convergent validity
in showing that three of the dimensions of internal representations were correlated with
measures of empathy and the quality of pretend play in 8-10 year-old children (Niec &
Russ, 2002). Further extending the validity of the SCORS to a clinical population, Stein
et al., (2012) demonstrated that the SCORS displayed good internal consistency as well
as high interrater reliability in a sample of 59 patients referred to a hospital for
assessment. Stein et al., (2012) also demonstrated that the SCORS components were
appropriately related to various aspects of cognitive and personality functioning.
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Data Analysis
The relationship between the two variables in this study will be measured using a
correlation analysis. It is hypothesized that parent and child reflective function will be
positively and significantly associated as demonstrated by positive correlations between
parent reflective functioning and child scores on each of the SCORS scales.

Aims and Hypotheses
1. The primary hypothesis is that parents who score higher on the RF Scale applied
to the PDI will have children who score higher on the SCORS as applied to the
TAT. In other words, there will be a significant correlation between parent RF
and child performance on a composite value of the individual SCORS scales,
representing both child mentalization capacities and overall child object relations
functioning.
2. Secondary quantitative analyses will be directed toward answering the question of
whether parental RF is more strongly related either to mentalization processes
directed toward the self or those directed toward understanding the other.
3. On the basis of prior research, it is anticipated that some of the 8 variables
considered on the SCORS may be more likely than others to be significantly
correlated with parental RF. In particular, the ‘Affective Quality of
Representations’ scale has been shown to be related to attachment status
(Handelzalts, Fisher & Naot, 2014), which is strongly correlated with
mentalization. As a result, it is predicted that parental RF will be correlated with
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child affective quality on the SCORS. This is further bolstered by the finding that
‘Affective Quality of Representations’ was the variable that was found to be
disrupted both in children who had suffered physical abuse and those who
suffered sexual abuse, suggesting that this variable may be a particularly adept
measure of child emotional functioning.
4. As detailed in the literature review, parental RF is strongly linked to children’s
development of a sense of self. Therefore, the ‘Identity and Coherence of Self’
scale is also predicted to correlate with parental RF.
5. Parental RF is also hypothesized to correlate with the SCORS scale
‘Understanding of Social Causality,’ given the established connection between
parent mentalization and child emotion understanding/theory of mind, which
bears much conceptual overlap with the ‘Understanding of Social Causality’
scale.

RESULTS
Demographics
The present research analyzed archival data from 15 parent-child dyads. Thirteen
of the 15 parent interviews were completed with the child’s mother, one interview was
completed with a custodial father, and one with a custodial grandmother. The children
ranged in age from 4.5 to 15. The sample is representative of the larger Psychological
Center population, which is comprised of mostly working class or lower income families
of minority ethnic status.
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Individual Outcome Measures
(1) Reflective Function Scores on the Parent Development Interview
One expert coder with prior established reliability coded reflective functioning on
the PDI. This is the standard for measurement of RF in PDI and AAI interviews. The
coder was blind to the research hypotheses and to participant identifying information.
The RF scale can produce ratings ranging from -1 to 9. In the current sample, the
data range was limited to only half of the possible scale points, lacking extreme scores on
both sides of the scale spectrum and mostly distributed at or below the Average RF
marker. RF scores of parents ranged from 2-6, with the most common scores being 2, 4,
and 5. An overall score of 2 lies between the diagnostic markers of 1 (Lacking in RF) and
3 (Questionable or Low RF). An overall score of 5 connotes “Ordinary RF” and indicates
that the interviewee has a model of their own mind and their child’s mind that is
integrated and coherent. In the current sample, only one interview was scored a 6. All
others earned scores demonstrating average or below average RF.
(2) Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale on the Thematic Apperception Test
Seven of the eight SCORS scales were utilized in this study. The eighth scale,
‘Emotional Investment in Values and Moral Standards’ was excluded because the coders
were not trained in scoring that subscale. Furthermore, both empirical and theoretical
support for a potential relationship between parent RF and child performance on this
scale was lacking. The seven remaining scales were scored on a scale ranging from 1 to 7
by two expert coders, each of whom independently coded 15 TAT protocols, consisting
of a total of 164 individual stories. Coders were blind to the research hypotheses, to
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participant information other than an ID number, and to each other’s scores. Interrater
reliability was calculated for each dimension of the SCORS, and was consistently in the
good to excellent range (Peters, Hilsenroth, Eudell-Simmons, Blagys & Handler, 2006).
Reliabilities were similar to or better than those reported in the SCORS literature. All
reliability coefficients are reported in Table 1.

Table 1. Interrater Reliabilities for Raters of TAT with SCORS, using intraclass
correlations, average measures, with 95% confidence interval reported
Variable
Correlation Lower bound Upper bound
Complexity of representation of people
.735
.640
.806
Affective quality of representations
.795
.758
.827
Emotional investment in relationships
.816
.750
.865
Understanding of social causality
.832
.771
.876
Experience, management of aggression
.872
.826
.906
Self-esteem
.639
.509
.735
Identity and Coherence of Self
.660
.537
.750

Given the wide range of child ages in the present sample, and the fact that the
SCORS has been ascertained to differentiate between children of different ages (Niec &
Russ, 2002; Westen et al., 1991) statistical analyses were run to determine the effect of
child age on the relationship between parent mentalization and child mentalization. As
might be expected, child age correlated significantly with a composite value across all
SCORS scales. Child age also correlated significantly with three of the seven individual
SCORS scales utilized in this study. All correlations are presented in Tables 2 and 3
below.

Table 2. Correlation between Child Age and Composite SCORS value
Child Age
Correlation (Spearman’s Rho)
Composite
.785**
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Table 3. Correlations between Individual SCORS Scales and Child Age
SCORS Scale
Correlation (Spearman’s Rho)
Complexity of representation of people
.77**
Affective quality of representations
.2
Emotional investment in relationships
.65*
Understanding of social causality
.8**
Experience, management of aggression
-.05
Self-esteem
-.36
Identity and Coherence of Self
-.012
** Significant at the p < .001 level
* Significant at the p < .05 level
Relationship between Outcome Measures:
Spearman correlations were used in order to measure the quantitative
relationships between parental Reflective Functioning and child performance on the
SCORS. The data did not neatly fit the assumptions of normal distribution that ensure the
validity of the Pearson correlation. The non-parametric Spearman correlations are
therefore considered to be a more accurate representation of the relationships between the
outcome variables (Myers & Sirois, 2006).
None of the Spearman correlations were statistically significant. However, the
magnitude (effect size) of some of the correlations yielded values that are considered to
indicate relationships of small and moderate clinical significance (Cohen, 1992). As such,
what follows is a presentation of the specific results in terms of the magnitude of the
correlations between variables.
Hypothesis 1: Parent RF scores will correlate with composite child SCORS values
The primary hypothesis was that there would be a positive correlation between
parental Reflective Functioning scores and child values of the SCORS scales.
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Past research using the SCORS has shown that the scales of the SCORS are correlated
with one another (e.g. Niec & Russ, 2002, Ackerman, Hilsenroth, Clemence, Weatherill
& Fowler, 2001). As a result, prior researchers have chosen to average the SCORS scales
in order to create an overall SCORS composite score that can serve as a unified indicator
of an individual’s functioning in the object relations domain (Defife et al., 2015; Stein,
Hilsenroth, Pinsker-Aspen and Primavera, 2009; Peters et al., 2006; Calabrese, Farber
and Westen, 2005; Eudell-Simmons, Stein, Defife and Hilsenroth, 2005; Ford, Fisher and
Larson, 1997). Following the example of these prior studies, a reliability analysis was
conducted with the seven scales of the SCORS to determine whether they were positively
correlated with one another. The reliability analysis demonstrated that six of the scales
were positively correlated with one another (excluding only self-esteem). Cronbach’s
alpha for these six scales was .66, which approaches the lower limit of what is considered
to be acceptable reliability (Santos, 1999). As such, a composite of the six scales was
calculated as an overall SCORS score for each child. (The seventh scale (self-esteem)
was excluded from the composite because it was not correlated with the other scales and
so cannot be considered to be measuring the same construct, invalidating its inclusion in
the composite.) A correlation was run between parental RF and the overall composite
SCORS value. The Spearman correlation value was .28 (see table 3.) This is a correlation
of medium effect size and provides an alternative way of understanding the study
outcomes, as will be further explained in the Discussion section.

Table 4. Correlation between Composite SCORS value and Parental RF on the PDI
SCORS Scale
Correlation (Spearman’s Rho)
Composite
.281
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Hypothesis 2: Parent RF scores will correlate more strongly with those dimensions of
mentalization that are directed toward the self rather than the other.
This hypothesis was not confirmed by the data. Of the six SCORS scales utilized
in the present study, only “Self- Esteem” and “Identity and Coherence of Self” can be
considered variables that strictly deal with the child’s relationship with the self. “SelfEsteem” correlated relatively strongly with parental RF, although not in the predicted
positive direction. “Identity and Coherence of Self” correlated with parental RF with a
magnitude of .2, which was not significantly different from the magnitude of correlations
involving scales looking at factors related to others, or scales that encompass elements of
both self and other-directed processes. The implications of this null finding will be
further explored in the Discussion section that follows.
The next three hypotheses refer to correlations between parent RF and individual
SCORS scales. Prior to addressing each individual hypothesis, it must be restated that
none of the correlations between parent RF and individual scores scales were found to be
statistically significant. However, most of the effect sizes were in the range in which they
are considered to demonstrate either a small or moderate clinical relationship as per
statistical convention (Cohen, 1992). All values are presented in table 5 below:
Table 5. Correlations between Individual SCORS scales and Parental RF on the PDI
SCORS Scale
Correlation (Spearman’s Rho)
Complexity of representation of people
.160
Affective quality of representations
.149
Emotional investment in relationships
.348
Understanding of social causality
.217
Experience, management of aggression
.070
Self-esteem
-.298
Identity and Coherence of Self
.197
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Hypothesis 3: Parent RF will be positively correlated with child ‘Affective Quality of
Representations’ on the SCORS.
The correlation between parent RF and the ‘Affective Quality of Representations’
scale can be considered to be small but not clinically insignificant, with a value of .15.
Hypothesis 4: Parent RF will be positively correlated with child ‘Identity and Coherence
of Self’ on the SCORS.
A correlation with an effect size considered to be of small to moderate magnitude
(.2) was found between parent RF and the ‘Identity and Coherence of Self’ scale.
Hypothesis 5: Parent RF will be positively correlated with child ‘Understanding of Social
Causality.’
Parent RF and the child ‘Understanding of Social Causality’ scale were related
with a value of .22, considered to be a small/medium effect size.

DISCUSSSION
In this section, the results presented above will be reviewed in the context of
relevant literature. Hypothesis 1 posited that a correlation would be found between parent
RF on the PDI and the child composite SCORS value. The findings pertaining to this
hypothesis will be discussed in relation to mentalization research, particularly
considering what the present study brings to bear on the question of the intergenerational
transmission of mentalization. Hypothesis 2 suggested that SCORS scales pertaining to
the self would correlate more strongly with parent RF than SCORS scales having more to
do with the other. The null results of this hypothesis will be analyzed. Hypotheses 3-5,
concerning the relationships between parent mentalization and individual SCORS scales,
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will be discussed. The results will then be explored in terms of how parent RF has been
shown to relate to child object relations functioning. The theory behind each SCORS
scale will be explained for a more comprehensive understanding of this aspect of the
results. Finally, the study limitations and future directions will be presented.

Hypothesis 1: Parental Reflective Function will correlate with child scores on the
Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale
As stated above, the correlation between parent RF and the child SCORS
composite value was not statistically significant. This can be explained by two main
factors: the small sample size, and the limited range of parental RF scores. Firstly, the
small sample size inherently limits the chances of detecting statistically significant
differences. Secondly, the limited variance found in parental RF scores constrained the
extent to which parental RF could be found to co-vary with other factors. Although the
RF scale theoretically spans 11 values from -1 to 9, in the present sample scores ranged
only from 2 to 6, with the vast majority of scores ranging only from 2 to 5.
Despite the lack of statistical significance, the moderate magnitude of the
correlation warrants further discussion of its potential meaning in the context of
mentalization research.
Evidence for Transmission of Mentalization
One of the main objectives of the present study was to look at whether
mentalization, or capacities related to mentalization, would be shown to have been
transmitted from parent to child. As stated in the results section above, parent
mentalization on the PDI demonstrated a correlation with the composite SCORS score

	
  

50	
  

that was above the standard for a medium effect size. The composite score consisted of
the following scales: ‘Complexity of Representations’,’ Affective Quality of
Representations’, ‘Emotional Investment in Relationships’, ‘Understanding of Social
Causality’, ‘Management of Aggression’, and ‘Identity and Coherence of Self’.
There is much theoretical support for the notion that these SCORS scales could
together capture information about the individual child that is akin to the child’s capacity
to mentalize. Westen et al. (1991) posited that the SCORS scales are able to assess the
subject’s internalized representations of the self and others, and therefore to tap into the
attachment information that is known to directly influence mentalization capacity.
Furthermore, Westen et al., (1991) stated that participants’ SCORS values reflect their
conscious and unconscious responses to social information in the context of both
situational cues and their developmental background, and likened this mechanism to the
internal working models of attachment theory. This description bears remarkable
similarity to the definition of Reflective Function as an ability to implicitly and explicitly
make sense of one’s own and other’s behavior as an expression of mental states (Fonagy
et al., 2002). Furthermore, Westen’s analogous reference to attachment theory, the theory
from which the concept of reflective function was derived, draws a clear theoretical
parallel between values on the SCORS and reflective function abilities.
Indeed, much of the conceptual overlap between the measures of Reflective
Function and the SCORS is based in the commonalities of the theories to which they
correspond. Stein et al., (2011) point out three key similarities between attachment theory
and object relations theory. Firstly, both theories suggest that early relationships with
caregivers form the foundation to later experiences of the self and of others. Secondly,
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both theories hypothesize that internalized mental representations are the mechanism
through which early relationships influence later experience. Thirdly, both theories
emphasize the roles of separations and reunions in forming and activating internalized
mental representations. As these commonalities suggest, the theoretical mechanism
through which early relationships affect later social interactions is shared by both
Attachment theory and Object Relations theory. Both theories posit that children
internalize the patterns of their interactions with caregivers and begin to direct their own
behavior on the basis of the responses they have grown to expect from their caregivers.
These internalized expectations of interactions are believed to impact the child’s
interpersonal behavior throughout the life span (Niec & Russ, 2002.)
There are also empirically-based parallels that can be drawn between the
Reflective Function scale and the SCORS. Firstly, Reflective Function is known to share
considerable overlap with the construct of empathy (Katznelson, 2014). Likewise, Niec &
Russ (2002) found that the SCORS scales of Complexity of Representations, Affective
Quality of Representations, Emotional Investment in Relationships and Moral Standards,
and Social Causality were all positively correlated with self and teacher-rater empathy in
a sample of 2nd-4th grade children. Secondly, Slade (2005, p.271) states that
“mentalization integrates ways of knowing that are at once cognitive and affective.”
Similarly, the SCORS composite score is made up of both cognitive and affective
components. Past research has demonstrated that the ‘Complexity of Representations’
and ‘Social Causality’ scales consistently correlate with cognitive measures while
‘Affective Quality of Representations’ and ‘Emotional Investment in Relationships’ are
understood to be more affective in nature (Inslegers et al., 2012.)
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In summary, it is reasonable to conclude that the SCORS composite measure may
serve as a proxy for mentalization abilities in the child. Considering this, the correlation
of moderate effect-size that was found between parental Reflective Function and the
SCORS composite can be cautiously interpreted as pointing toward a transmission of
mentalization, thereby supporting Fonagy’s (2006) assertion that parental mentalizing of
the child stimulates mentalizing in the child. Of course, without statistically significant
results, it is impossible to say that this has been conclusively demonstrated by the present
research, and the significant correlation between the SCORS composite and child age
further complicates interpretation of the results. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the
moderate effect size of the correlation is in line with that found by Ensink et al., (2015) in
their study linking parent RF with child RF in middle childhood.
The proposed connection between parent and child mentalization is supported by
a closer look at the data. The parent and child quoted below, referred to as Dyad A for
ease of reference, both earned scores indicative of lower levels of mentalization. The
parent’s PDI earned an overall score of ‘2’, which lies between the benchmarks of
“Absent RF” and “Questionable/Low RF.” Excerpts from the parent interview and child
TAT are quoted below:
Parent Interview:
I: Describe a time in the last week and you and your child really were not
clicking.
P: ‘When she don’t listen. It’s like when- we don’t click when I tell her, “No, I’m
not letting you do that.’ Okay, it was her friend’s birthday and she begged me and
begged me and begged me that she could go… …she wants to sleep over at
(friend’s) house. Her mother say yes and I say no. And (child) was very angry.
She was very mad. She was ‘Ohhh! I don’t like you! I don’t like you!’
I: Why do you think she was angry?
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P: She’s spoiled! Because I said no!
I: How did it make you feel?
P: It hurts me. Because you know why? I been there… by myself… without help
from her father for a long time… and I tell her that. I tell her how I feel. I said,
‘Wow, (child), you are hurting my feelings.’ She goes, ‘So! I don’t care!’
Child TAT:
(responding to a card with a picture of a boy in the foreground and a surgical
scene in the background )
“Maybe he is having a flashback. Something happened in the past and he is
thinking what happened in the past. Next he is going to forget about it. I can’t tell
what happened before.”
In her interview, the parent at first leaves her own emotional experience out of the
example, providing a moment of not clicking based entirely on her daughter’s behavior“when she don’t listen.” When asked explicitly how she feels, the parent’s depiction of
her own mental state lacks specificity and depth. She says she feels hurt but does not
elaborate, instead quickly returning to providing a description of the exchange she had
with her daughter rather than the feelings or thoughts informing the behavior. The parent
also has difficulty reflecting upon her daughter’s internal states. She identifies that her
daughter was mad and angry, but explains the feelings as caused by static traits - because
her daughter is spoiled and did not get her way.
Interestingly, the child in the dyad omits a discussion of emotion from her TAT
story. (This was consistent throughout this child’s TAT responses.) Furthermore, the
thoughts that she attributes to her characters are extremely concrete, related as directly as
possible to the action described, much like the mother’s narrative.
In contrast, the dyad below, referred to as Dyad B, is an example on the other side
of the reflective functioning spectrum. The parent here scored a 6 on the PDI, the highest
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score assigned in the current research sample. This score represents RF that is slightly
above average, on its way to being what is referred to as “Marked RF” in which the
parent’s narrative demonstrates a fairly consistent reflective stance indicative of a steady
psychological model of one’s own and others’ minds. The same excerpt of the PDI and
same TAT story are quoted for ease of comparison:
Parent Interview
I: Can you describe a time in the last week when you and (child) were not
clicking, or did not click?
P: …A particular morning, he just, I pulled the covers off of him, he pulls it right
back over him, he just doesn’t feel like wanting to get up, he just, um, questions
every motive and every move I’m making- why do I have to wear those jeans? I
want to wear the other jeans. Why do I have to put on that shirt? I don’t want to
wear that, and I don’t want to brush my hair…
I: And how did you feel?
P: Frustrated, um, I felt my authority was being questioned, and… just um,
disrespected.
T: And how do you think he felt?
P: He felt, um, he felt like I was just opposing on his sleep time opposing on what
he wanted to wear, he wanted to wear something else. Um, he felt… frustrated as
well, annoyed, and tired.
Child TAT
(Responding to card with a picture of a boy in the foreground and a surgical scene
in the background).
Before I think the grandfather, I believe, was doing… was doing fine but maybe
had something with him that was wrong. That he needed surgery. So the kid is
like….um, now the grandpa is getting surgery, like three doctors, while the kid is
waiting for it to see how he is. In the present I think the grandfather’s gonna be
okay. And the kid’s gonna be like, really happy. And I think the kid is feeling like
um, like worried about how his grandfather might be. And I don’t think the
grandfather’s like, feeling anything right now because usually when you get
surgery, you fall asleep. (What are they thinking?) He’s thinking about….he’s
thinking about the future, like how, how happy he’s gonna be about seeing his
grandpa okay.
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Both the parent and child in Dyad B seem to have much to say about the
emotional lives of themselves and others. The parent here is able to name her own
frustrations about her son in a non-defensive manner that implicitly demonstrates that she
takes ownership over her feelings. She is also able to imagine the feelings of her son.
While she names frustration as an emotion that is present for both herself and her son, her
nuanced thinking about each of their internal states allows her to differentiate the causes
of the feeling such that her own feeling is distinguishable from that which she assigns to
her son. Moreover, both feeling descriptions seem plausible and situationally appropriate.
The child in Dyad B includes a lot of information about what his TAT characters
are thinking and feeling, in stark contrast to the child in Dyad A. This child grapples with
the difficulty of a picture with two distinct parts but does not back away from wanting to
detail not only the thoughts and feelings of the boy in the foreground but also those of the
man on the surgical table. The people in this boy’s narrative come to life as he supplies
information about the contents of their minds.
The consistency in mental state focus (or lack thereof) between parent and child
within these two dyads, as well as the contrast between Dyad A and Dyad B, provide
both support and an illustration of the finding that parent and child mentalization abilities
are related to one another. Additionally, this excerpted raw data also invites consideration
of the potential mechanisms for the quantitative findings. In Dyad A, the narrative
suggests that the mother struggles to create room for thoughts and feelings alongside
behaviors. Instead, actions subsume the internal states that precipitated them. It seems
that in her relationship with her daughter, this mother has attached her own meanings to
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her daughter’s behavior, unable to reflect on her daughter’s likely thoughts, feelings,
desires, and other internal states. In turn, this has potentially impaired her daughter’s
ability to know her own mind and to reflect upon others’ thoughts and feelings, as
demonstrated by the daughter’s omission of internal states while telling stories on the
TAT.
A different parallel process seems to have occurred in Dyad B. Here, the mother
knows her own mind and can think clearly about her son’s mind. This mother has a
nuanced understanding of feelings in which she knows them to be qualitatively affected
by their root causes. One can only imagine that this mother’s responses to her child’s
behavior are informed by her consideration of the content of his mind. It is no wonder,
then, that her son, when faced with the task of telling a story about different characters,
demonstrates an ability to think about the thoughts and feelings of the characters in the
story. Just as his mother can differentiate her mind from his, he is careful to consider the
thoughts and feelings of the different characters separately.
In summary, these excerpts of the data demonstrate the plausibility of the
transmission of mentalization. They suggest that a parent’s interactions with her/his child
are very much informed by that parent’s experience of the child’s mind. The two parents
quoted here not only demonstrate different tendencies toward/away from considering
their child’s internal states, they differ in terms of whether they see their child’s
motivations as benign vs. malevolent and to what extent they can separate their child’s
internal states from that child’s actions and from their own thoughts and feelings as
parents. In turn, the children respond in unique ways to the task of telling a story about
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characters in a picture, revealing disparate notions of what information is important to
convey about people.*

Hypothesis 2: Parental Reflective Function will be more related to scales pertaining
to the self, rather than to the other:
As reviewed above, theory and research have shown that mentalization plays a
role in the development of a sense of self, and that parent mentalization is associated with
higher self esteem (Katz et al., 2012). Furthermore, Ensink et al., (2015) found that
maternal reflective function was an important predictor of Child self Reflective Function
even when child reflective function was disrupted by something like abuse. Due to this
prior research and theory, it was expected that scales on the scores that pertain more to
the self might demonstrate stronger correlations with parental reflective function than
scales pertaining to the other. On the basis of Westen’s (1995) scale descriptions, it was
ascertained that the scales that refer to processes directed at the self are ‘Self Esteem’
(SE) and ‘Identity and Coherence of Self’ (ICS). The scales that are more other-directed
are ‘Affective Quality of Relationships,’ ‘Emotional Investment in Relationships’ and
‘Social Causality,’ while ‘Complexity of Representations’ and ‘Experience and
Management of Aggression’ deal equally with representations of the self and the other.
On the basis of this delineation, scores on SE and ICS would be predicted to correlate
more strongly with parental RF. This was not found in the present study. ICS correlated
with Parental Reflective Function at a value that was consistent with those of other
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
*
It must be noted that the dyads quoted for this example were selected because both
parent and child RF were demonstrated to be toward the extremes of high or low for the
sample. These are two particular dyads chosen to illustrate what transmission of
mentalization can qualitatively look like; they are not indicative of the overall sample.
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SCORS scales, and SE demonstrated a surprising moderately-sized negative correlation
with Parental Reflective Function. Prior to exploring this surprising negative correlation,
it is important to note that prior research that has detected a distinction between selfdirected mentalization and other-directed mentalization utilized explicit self-report
measures of child mentalization. The SCORS, in contrast, is applied to the TAT, in which
the narratives that are generated are at once representations of the self and of others
projected onto story characters. Therefore, it may be that it is not possible to tease apart
self and other- related constructs using this measure.
Nevertheless, the unexpected result of a negative correlation between parent RF
and self-esteem requires further exploration. The self-esteem scale on the SCORS
assesses the individual’s self-concept (Stein et al., 2011). At the lowest scale values, the
individual sees him/herself as evil, and as having negative effects on others. At slightly
higher scale values the individual sees the self as inferior and inadequate, and
demonstrates low self-esteem. As scores on the scale increase, representations begin to
show a range of both positive and negative feelings about the self. At the high end of the
scale the individual demonstrates reality-based positive feelings about the self
(Hilsenroth, Stein and Pinsker, 2007).
There are various possible explanations for the unexpected result that self-esteem
correlated negatively with parent RF. It may be that the lack of statistical significance and
small sample size indicate that the negative correlation between parent reflective
functioning and child self-esteem reported here is not indicative of a real relationship
between these two variables. Alternatively, a measurement issue may have been at play.
Westen (2002), as cited in Kelly (2007), stated that three of the scales of the SCORS-G-
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(the version of the SCORS utilized here) are hard to score when TATs are the source of
data. These three scales are ICS, SE and AGG (Experience and Management of
Aggression). In the current data set, two of these three scales showed relationships with
parent reflective function that were distinct from those of the other SCORS scales, with
SE correlating negatively with parent RF and AGG being the only variable that correlated
with parent RF with a negligible effect size. Future research may be able to clarify the
veracity or erroneous nature of the negative correlation between parent mentalization and
self-esteem found here.
Were future research to demonstrate that the finding between parent RF and child
self-esteem on the SCORS was not a statistical accident, a non-statistical explanation for
this finding would be warranted. One such explanation revolves around the fact that for
this study the child population utilized was a clinical population. The exact diagnoses of
the children in the study are not known. However, it can be hypothesized on the basis of
the general child population at the Psychological Center and the fact that the main referral
sources are neighborhood schools that the children in the sample likely suffered some
internalizing difficulties such as depression, and some externalizing difficulties such as
acting out or attention problems in school. With greater mentalization capacities comes
greater self-awareness, greater knowledge of what one is thinking and feeling, and greater
insight into what others’ think and feel, including about oneself. It may be, then, that in
this clinical population, in which the children can assumed to have a good deal of
negative affect and problematic relationships, greater insight into their own affect and
others’ perceptions of the self could in fact lead to lower self-esteem. Indeed, this might
be especially true given that the data was collected just as these children were presenting
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for intake at the Psychological Center, with their psychological difficulties thus being
front and center in their minds.

Hypotheses 3: There will be a positive correlation between parent RF and child
SCORS values on the ‘Affective Quality of Representations’ scale.
The ‘Affective Quality of Representations’ scale assesses the general emotional
tone of a child’s representations of people and relationships. Rather than moving along a
developmental trajectory as do many of the other scales, progression on this scale is
marked by the move from predominantly negative to predominantly positive object
representations. (Indeed, this scale did not correlate significantly with child age). At the
lowest point on the ‘Affective Quality of Representations’ scale, people are represented
as violent or abandoning, and at the highest scale point interactions with others can be
seen as not only benign but also valuable.
As was true of all correlations between outcome variables, the relationship
between parent RF and child values on the ‘Affective Quality of Representations’ scale
was not statistically significant. The effect size of the correlation (.15), was of a
magnitude considered to be indicative of a small clinical relationship. This points toward
the relationship between the variables that was expected, but must be replicated with
statistically significant results in order for this relationship to be truly empirically
established.

Hypothesis 4: There will be a positive correlation between parent RF and child
SCORS values on the ‘Identity and Coherence of Self’ scale.
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The correlation between parent RF and child values on the ‘Identity and
Coherence of Self’ scale had an effect size of .197, indicating a small/moderate clinical
relationship. Again, in order for this relationship to be definitively demonstrated,
replication with statistical significance would be necessary. Nevertheless, this meaningful
effect size suggests that as expected, there is some relationship between parent
mentalization capacities and a measure of selfhood.
The ‘Identity and Coherence of Self’ scale measures the extent to which the sense
of self is firmly established and integrated. Low scores on this scale depict a fragmented
sense of self. Scores in the middle point to an unstable sense of self in which multiple
aspects of selfhood can shift easily (including goals or emotions about the self). At the
higher levels of this scale the individual’s representations suggest the achievement of a
consistent and integrated sense of self complete with long-term aspirations and a sense of
purpose (Hilsenroth et al., 2007). As summarized in the literature review, Fonagy’s
theory of mentalization posits that parent reflective function is crucial in the development
of a secure and integrated sense of self. The current findings lend tentative empirical
support to that view.

Hypothesis 5: There will be a positive correlation between parent RF and child
SCORS values on the ‘Understanding of Social Causality’ scale.
The “Understanding of Social Causality’ scale on the SCORS measures the
accuracy, rationality, complexity and psychological-mindedness of the attributions that
individuals make about the causes of other people’s behavior, thoughts and feelings
(Westen, 1991). Low scores are earned when individuals give explanations of
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psychological or interpersonal events that are either not based on the idea of causality at
all, or that are illogical. At the scale’s midpoint, representations demonstrate accurate
depictions of causality and rudimentary understanding of the ways in which thoughts and
feelings affect behavior. At the highest scale point, not only is there a complex
understanding of how thoughts, feelings and behaviors interrelate as causal factors in
interpersonal interactions, there is also an understanding of unconscious motivations. On
the level of face validity, this scale shares the most conceptual overlap with theory of
mind, although there is no known empirically demonstration of a quantitative relationship
between the two.
The correlation between parent RF and child scores on the ‘Understanding of
Social Causality’ scale had an effect size of .2, another small-moderate clinical
relationship. This finding echoes the studies that have demonstrated links between parent
mentalization and child Theory of Mind development (Meins et al., 2013; Meins et al.,
2002). However, unlike the prior two scales discussed, the ‘Social Causality’ scale had a
strong significant correlation with child age (Rho= .8, p < .001). This significant
correlation with age (in a sample with children of a wide range of ages) complicates the
ability to say that it is parent mentalization, rather than merely child age, which affected
child scores on the scale.

Evidence for Effects of Parent Mentalization on Child Internal Representations of
Object Relations
Although initial hypothesis predicted that the three scales discussed in Hypotheses
3-5 would correlate most strongly with parent RF, the actual data showed similar effect
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sizes for each of the individual SCORS scales, as well as the SCORS composite.
Therefore, it is worth considering what the findings of small and moderate effect sizes
can say about the relationship between parent mentalization and child object relations in
the context of object relations research.
Firstly, it should be noted that the design of the current study is unique in the
context of the existing SCORS literature. Past SCORS research has primarily been used
to distinguish between clinical and nonclinical groups of children. The current study aims
to go one step farther and consider how a child’s object relations are affected by a
characteristic of their parents rather than a characteristic of the children themselves.
Given the insignificant findings, it is not possible to say that it has been demonstrated that
parent mentalization has been shown to be linked to child object relations. Nevertheless,
it is noteworthy that the effect sizes in the present research point toward a meaningful
result given that the variable of parental mentalization is far more subtle and less concrete
than other factors studied with the SCORS to date, such as the presence of a diagnosis or
the experience of abuse. This suggests that parental mentalization should be taken
seriously as a factor that affects child and adolescent object relations.
Previous SCORS research also provides an alternative explanation for the results.
As cited above, several studies have worked to establish the SCORS as a developmental
measure. While some studies have shown no correlation between SCORS ratings and
child age (Inslegers et al., 2012) others have found the scales to be able to discriminate
among developmental levels in participants (Niec & Russ, 2002; Westen et al., 1990). In
the current sample, the SCORS composite score and three of the individual SCORS
scales correlated significantly with child age. This suggests that at least in the case of the
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SCORS composite and these three scales, the relationship between parent RF and child
Object Relations functioning was heavily influenced by child age. A closer look at the
individual SCORS scales not discussed above will further shed light on what the results
suggest about how parent mentalization might affect child object relations functioning.
Emotional Investment in Relationships
This scale considers the nature of the participant’s representations of
relationships, and in particular, what can be gained from relationships with others. At the
lower levels of the scale, considered to be consistent with earlier stages of development,
the individual demonstrates concern only for himself, seeing relationships merely as a
means of gratifying of his own needs. Increasing scores on this scale indicate increased
investment in relationships, and increased mutuality, commitment, empathy and concern.
At the highest scale point, individuals have representations that demonstrate an ability to
maintain a strong sense of their autonomous self in the context of mutual relationships
(Westen, 1991). The positive correlation of moderate effect size between parental RF and
the ‘Emotional Investment in Relationships’ scale may suggest that children whose
parents mentalize more are more able to differentiate self from other, and to consider
relationships as mutually rewarding. However, the ‘Emotional Investment in
Relationships’ scale was one of the scales that correlated significantly with child age. If
future research were able to replicate this relationship while controlling for child age, this
finding would be considered consistent with prior research finding that children whose
parents engage in more emotion-coaching have better peer-relationships (Katz et al.,
2012).
Complexity of Representations of People
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This scale captures the extent to which representations of the other are
differentiated from the self, complex, and able to integrate both positive and negative
traits (Westen, 1991). Low values on this scale demonstrate representations of others that
are undifferentiated from the self and focused on actions rather than personality.
Furthermore, low scores on this scale are consistent with the assumption that traits are
global and either all good or all bad. At the midpoint of this scale the individual is able to
represent others as having a small amount of personality or internal mental life. High
values on this scale connote representations of others in which subjective experience is
grasped in a complex way and history and other factors are understood to inform
personality. In many ways, this scale is able to measure some of the factors that were
noted as distinct in the examples of Dyad A and Dyad B above. As discussed earlier, the
mother in Dyad B demonstrated an ability to differentiate herself from her son in a way
that was not as evident in the mother in Dyad A. Furthermore, it was noted that the
characters in the story told by the child in Dyad B demonstrated a greater presence of
internal life than the story told by the child in Dyad A. This scale also correlated
significantly with child age.
Experience and Management of Aggression
The only scale that did not seem to relate to parental mentalization in any
meaningful way was that of Experience and Management of Aggression. A bottom score
on this scale is assigned when the participant’s representations are of people who have
limitless aggression and no ability to control it, who are sadistic and violent. A slightly
higher score is assigned when representations display anger, passive aggression, and an
inability to stave off physical harm to the self. At a higher level anger is avoided through
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the use of defense mechanisms, and at the highest level anger is appropriately expressed
and people are able to practice appropriate self-assertion.
It may be that the fact that the present research drew children from a clinical
population influenced the null finding of a relationship between parent mentalization and
child management of aggression. In a clinical sample of predominantly male children in
middle childhood, the aggression associated with much of the psychopathology of
children of this age may have overpowered any connection between parent characteristics
and child functioning in this particular domain of object relations.

Limitations
Several factors must be considered as limitations to the conclusions that can be
drawn on the basis of the present research. There are certain aspects of the sample that
bear mention. The sample size of the current study is small, which lowered the possibility
of finding statistically significant results. Statistical significance provides a certain
confidence in the findings that cannot be provided by effect sizes alone. Combined with
the small sample size, the large range of child ages included in the study poses a
particular difficulty in the interpretation of the results due to the significant correlation
between child age and some of the SCORS scales. Future research should either use a
sample of more homogenous age, or a larger sample size in which the effects of child age
can be more easily measured. Finally, as mentioned previously, there was limited
variability in the Reflective Function scores of the parents in the sample, with all scores
falling in the middle range of Reflective Function, and a dearth of either particularly low
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or particularly high RF values. This imposed yet another challenge to achieving
statistically significant results.
Other aspects of the sample limit the generalizeability of the present research.
Firstly, the vast majority of the parent participants in the study were mothers, also
limiting the generalizeability of the results to fathers and other caregivers. With regard to
the children included in the research, the current sample was culled from a clinical
population, with all children in the study either receiving or seeking psychotherapy
treatment at the time of testing. This may affect the generalizeability of the results to a
non-clinical sample.
In addition to limitations pertaining to the sample, there are limitations related to
the correlational methods utilized in the current study, namely that causality cannot be
established. We cannot know if it is indeed parental reflective function that affects
children’s performance on the SCORS scales, or if other factors are at play and
influencing both variables. For example, maternal education level has been found to
influence children’s performance on theory of mind tasks (Meins et al., 2002; Meins &
Fernyhough, 1999). Similarly, parental education has inconsistently been found to
influence parental reflection scores (Rosenblum et al., 2008; Fonagy et al., 1991c). Future
research would benefit from measurement of parental education to better understand the
ways in which this factor might play a role in the transmission of mentalization
capacities. Likewise, two subscales of the SCORS- the ‘Understanding of Social
Causality’ and ‘Complexity of Representation of People’ scales- have been found to be
related to child verbal achievement (Pinsker-Aspen, Stein & Hilsenroth, 2007; Niec &
Russ, 2002; Levy, Blatt & Shaver, 1998; Leigh, Westen, Barends, Mendel & Byers,
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1992). Since child verbal achievement was not measured as part of this research, it is not
impossible that some connection between parent and child intelligence and/or child
verbal skill is driving some of the connections observed here.
One final limitation of the present research is the lack of consistency in the
administration of the PDI interview and the TAT. The interviews and TATs were
administered by a diverse group of training therapists, some of whom were more
practiced than others in the administration of these instruments. The quality and nature of
the inquiry is therefore not uniform across data points, which may have affected the
results. Although it is not logical that this would have affected the trends observed in any
systematic way, it is nevertheless a methodical limitation of the present research that
should be addressed in any future studies.

Future Directions
In order to address the limitations presented above, it would be beneficial for
future research to replicate the present study with a larger sample so as to increase
statistical power and possibility of generalization of the results. A larger sample size
would also permit the direct measurement of the potential effect of child age on the
relationship between parent and child mentalization. Future studies should also measure
parent educational level and child verbal intelligence, given the mixed prior findings of
the importance of these factors in influencing both of the outcome measures used in the
present research. Finally, in the present study the SCORS has been used as a proxy for
child mentalization. Future research might more explicitly measure child mentalization

	
  

69	
  

alongside the SCORS to empirically demonstrate the utility of the SCORS in detecting
aspects of child mentalization capacities.
Another important direction for future research would be a study looking
simultaneously at both attachment and mentalization transmission, given the wellestablished reciprocal relationship between the two constructs, outlined in the literature
review. While mentalization is considered to be one of the likely mechanisms for the
intergenerational transmission of attachment, the reciprocal may also be true- that
attachment may mediate the transmission of mentalization across generations. As stated
above, Arnott and Meins (2007) found that RF on the AAI predicted secure infant
attachment for both mothers and fathers above and beyond narrative coherence, the major
determinant of the autonomous attachment classification. Furthermore, attachment has
been found to predict earlier Theory of Mind development (Meins, 1997) and
performance on theory of mind tasks in early childhood (Fonagy et al., 1997). To the
extent that Theory of Mind bears much conceptual overlap with mentalization, and with
aspects of the SCORS such as Social Causality, these findings alongside those of the
present research beg the question of how parental RF and attachment security work
together to influence child Theory of Mind/mentalization abilities.
A new body of theoretical work also raises new questions about the role
attachment may play in the transmission of mentalization. Fonagy and Campbell (2015)
posit that one of the major evolutionary advantages of attachment is its provision of a
context in which mentalization capacities are acquired and social understandings are
achieved. Along with this notion comes the idea that within the attachment relationship
epistemic trust is generated through ostensive cues. Ostensive cues are information that is
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signaled as being an important communication of culturally relevant material (such as the
infant’s expressions, which are marked and mirrored by the caregiver). Mind-oriented
behaviors such as those involved in mentalization inherently provide an abundance of
ostensive cues, leading to a dynamic between adult and child in which each one is
receptive to new information and learning (Fonagy et al., 2017). Furthermore, where
epistemic trust exists (within a secure attachment relationship) the recipient of the
information is more likely to perceive information from the communicator as both
relevant and generalizeable (Fonagy et al. 2017). Both of these ideas have implications
for the development of mentalization capacities in the child, and the process of
transmission of mentalization. If mind-minded behaviors provide an environment of
receptivity to new information, then children in relationships with mentalizing caregivers
may be more open to learn about internal states- their own and others’. Similarly, where
more epistemic trust has been generated, the child marks information received about his
own and others’ internal states as more relevant and able to be generalized, thus being
perhaps more likely to continue to mentalize both himself and others. Epistemic trust is
therefore an important potential mediator/moderator to be considered in future research
on the transmission of mentalization.
Last but not least, in order to successfully tackle the question of mentalization
transmission from an empirical standpoint, research must address the development of
mentalization in childhood. As stated in the literature review, there is a rather nuanced
and comprehensive theory about how mentalization develops, but little empirical
literature to support it. Very recent theoretical developments may highlight a pathway
forward in the study of mentalization development. In the present, researchers are
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highlighting the multidimensional nature of mentalization with four main dimensions
having been identified: (1) cognitive/affective (2) self/other (3) implicit/explicit and (4)
inner/outer (pertaining to noticeable external cues like facial expressions versus
unobservable inner cues like motivations or wishes) (Bateman & Fonagy, 2011). The
acknowledgment of these four dimensions reinforces the merit of empirically studying
the quality as well as quantity of mentalization. Furthermore, they help to delineate a
pathway forward in studying how mentalization gone awry can inform development of
psychopathology. For example, Sharp and Fonagy and colleagues (Bo et al., 2017;
Fonagy et al., 2015; Sharp, 2104) posit a model of Borderline Personality Disorder in
which patients with BPD are seen as having the propensity to hypermentalize- meaning
that they attribute motivations, desires, beliefs, etc. to other people when there is no
objective evidence to inform these attributions (Sharp et al., 2013 as cited in Bo et al.,
2017). This hypermentalizing tendency is believed to result from an un-ideal interaction
between the dimensions of mentalization in which cognitive and affective mentalizing are
unintegrated, there is difficulty in distinguishing whether mental states belong to the self
or the other, and implicit/explicit mentalization can not be flexibly alternated due to
contextual demands. This example highlights the utility of considering variation among
the four dimensions of mentalization in future research. Specifically, as models of
mentalization development are empirically tested, the ways in which capacities along
these four dimensions come into being will be profoundly informative for future
understanding of mentalization transmission and the development of psychopathology.

Conclusion
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In conclusion, the present study adds to a small body of research considering the
ways in which parent and child mentalizing capacities are linked, as theory would
predict. The current research extends this area of inquiry to a child clinical sample. By
utilizing measures created from similar but distinct theoretical traditions, this study forges
new ground in illustrating a connection between mentalization and object relations.
Taken together, the study results highlight the importance of parent reflective functioning
in the mentalization capacities and object relations functioning of children with
psychological distress.
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